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1. The notion of the a priori underwent several changes 
since the time it came into existence in the Middle Ages. 
Originally it had been used to mark a certain form of 
argument, an argument that proceeds from what is prior to 
what is later, from cause to effect: demonstratio procedens 
ex causis ad effectum = demonstratio a priori. But this 
changed with Kant, for whom it meant not a form of 
argument but rather some special kind of knowledge (or 
elements thereof), namely knowledge that (a) is independ-
ent of particular experiences and (b) that makes experi-
ence in general (Erfahrung überhaupt) possible. Tied up 
with consciousness and the transcendental unity of 
apperception, Kant’s understanding of the a priori was in 
the spirit of his transcendental philosophy. But this 
understanding changed again with the rise of analytic 
philosophy, in which we still find the first characteristic but 
not the second anymore. The idea of Erfahrung überhaupt 
was given up, partly because one naturally wondered what 
exactly this notion of experience in general, or experience 
universally conceived, should be. Where should we get it 
from, if not by way of abstraction and generalization from 
individual cases of experience? And would this not make it 
an empirical concept, so that the whole project of asking 
for the conditions of its possibility would not lead us to the 
kind of certainty, necessity and universality we expect from 
a priori knowledge? There would be no guarantee that in 
the future we would not make discoveries that would give 
us new kinds of experiences or that would show us our 
experiences in a new light. Thus, we would have to admit 
that these experiences did not satisfy the conditions of 
experience we had set up originally. The a priori conditions 
would have to be revised. 
It seems that Kant did trust in our rational abilities in 
ways we do not any more. Kant believed that reason can 
understand itself and that we can find certainty. But it 
seems we no longer have such optimism, belief, or hope 
for absolute and certain knowledge. The idea of final 
solutions has been given up in many areas of research, 
and instead we have learned to be content with temporary 
solutions and various kinds of relative or approximate a 
priori’s. Instead of requiring, as Kant did, that everything 
that happens must follow from something else according to 
strict and determinate universal rules, we are more modest 
now in merely demanding some kind of regularity. Part of 
Kant’s rather demanding idea of the a priori has thus been 
given up. But does the entire transcendental project have 
to go as well? Or did analytic philosophy go too far by 
disregarding the second aspect of the a priori and by 
giving up the quest for the conditions of the possibility of 
experience in general? Already Hegel, often ignored by 
many analytic philosophers, did know how to relativize the 
a priori by conceiving of absolute knowledge as being 
relative to his time: Absolute knowledge is reached at the 
end of the Phenomonology of Spirit after we have worked 
through the history of consciousness from its beginning 
stages to its state in Hegel’s day and age. From the very 
beginning of the Phenomenology, the present determines 
the perspective and limits of knowledge. Nevertheless, for 
Hegel as also for Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein as 
always already being-in-the-world, it is not a question of 
avoiding a vicious circle but of getting into the circle in the 
right way. Kant was still satisfied to acknowledge that in 
philosophy definitions come at the end of inquiry, and 
although Hegel expressed some reservations when he 
famously wrote in 1820, at the end of the preface to his 
Philosophy of Right, that philosophy always comes rather 
late (“die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbre-
chenden Dämmerung ihren Flug”), both Kant and Hegel 
still trusted their holistic approaches and their preconcep-
tions of Erfahrung überhaupt.  
It is intrinsic to such a holistic approach that metaphysics 
and epistemology cannot be neatly separated. But since 
the development of modern modal logic and especially 
since Kripke taught us how to distinguish aprioricity from 
necessity, it now seems possible to make this separation. 
It is this kind of separation that I want to question. Kripke 
gave examples of statements that are necessary and a 
posteriori, or contingent and a priori. It is the latter, his 
notion of the continent a priori, that I want to criticize in 
what follows. 
2. In his lectures, published as Naming and Necessity, 
Kripke states, “I guess the traditional characterization from 
Kant goes somewhat like: a priori truths are those which 
can be known independently of any experience” (35). 
Taking an example from Wittgenstein, he argues that the 
statement P: “Stick S is one meter long” is a priori (or 
known a priori) but nevertheless contingent. Wittgenstein 
actually wrote: “There is one thing of which one can say 
neither that it is one meter long nor that it is not one meter 
long, and that is the standard meter in Paris” (PI, par. 49). 
Kripke probably misinterprets Wittgenstein when he says, 
“I think he must be wrong” (NN 54), as has been shown, 
convincingly I think, by Heather J. Gert (see bibliography). 
But whether Kripke here misinterprets Wittgenstein or not, 
it seems to me that on purely systematic grounds and 
contrary to what Kripke claims P is not both contingent and 
a priori.  
Kripke argues that the truth of P is contingent because 
heat could have been applied to the stick so that its length 
would have been different. He thinks of this as happening 
at the time of stipulation (NN, 55). In such a possible world 
the length of stick S would then not have been one meter. 
This is supposed to be part of the metaphysical status of 
P. On the other hand, the reference fixer knows P a priori 
because he knows that he used stick S to fix the reference 
of the expression “one meter.” According to Kripke, “he 
knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is 
one meter long” (NN, 56). This is supposed to be part of 
the epistemic status of P. All this seems to make sense, 
and not only at first blush. Even after much thinking and 
contemplation this somewhat paradoxical example seems 
to convincingly show that there are statements that are 
both contingent and a priori. Nevertheless, I think this 
example does not show what Kripke wants it to. Let us 
look at P in the actual world wa and in an imagined world 
wi.  
P(wa) = (stick S is 1 m long) (wa) 
= stick S(wa) is 1 m (wa) long 
In order to know P(wa) a priori, the reference fixer has to 
keep in mind that he used stick S(wa) to fix the reference 
of what he calls “1 m”. That is, he has to think:  
1 m (wa) = 1 m (S(wa)) and  




P(wa) = stick S(wa) is 1 m (S(wa)) long. 
In fact, the same applies to P(wi):  
P(wi) = stick S(wi) is 1 m (S(wi)) long. 
In wi stick S(wi) is used to carry out the stipulation, and 
therefore P(wi) turns out to be true as well; and the 
reference fixer in wi knows this a priori, as he did in wa. 
There is nothing special about wa in this respect. (I believe 
Kripke would not agree to this.) Nor is there anything 
special about the reference fixer. (Kripke would probably 
not accept this either.) We all know P a priori and the 
reference fixer is not in a privileged position. What we 
actually know a priori is not the statement P with respect to 
the particular stick S, but P with respect to any stick that 
happens to be the Urmeter. What we know a priori is the 
possibility of such a stipulation (which could be expressed 
in form of an if-then statement) and the fact that whatever 
we use as Urmeter is then “automatically”, as Kripke says, 
one meter long. In the end, what makes P a priori is an if-
then statement. This is my first main objection to Kripke’s 
account. 
Evidently, Kripke wants to understand it all differently. He 
takes the truth of P to be contingent: in fact, he wants P to 
be false in wi. He wants us to think of P in wi as: 
Q = stick S(wi) is not 1 m (wa) long 
Well, this statement is true, too, and we even know it a 
priori. But obviously this statement is different from P(wi). 
Now what should we take P to mean? How should we 
think of P in wi: as P(wi), as I suggest, or Q(wi), as Kripke 
wants it? As I said above, we have to think of “1 m” as 
being dependent on S. Otherwise we do not know P(wa) a 
priori. It is part of the meaning of “S” in P that it is the 
Urmeter. It is essential to S (in the context of P as known a 
priori) that it is the standard meter.  
We cannot meaningfully say Q in wi, because you 
cannot refer to 1 m (wa) in wi. Kripke of course wants to 
say Q in wa and not in wi. But I think this changes the 
meaning of P. To know P a priori, the stick and the 
reference (the act of referring) to the meter have to be 
taken from the same world, because the latter depends on 
the former. This is my second objection to Kripke’s 
account. 
Kripke does not tell us how he thinks the meter is 
defined in wi. He thinks this not important. In wi the meter 
cannot be fixed as the length of S(wa), because there is no 
way to, so to speak, “go back” from wi to wa. Kripke is 
silent about this. But I do not think that we can afford to be 
silent here. We cannot simply say that we don’t need to 
give an answer to this question just because we are 
dealing with the metaphysical aspect of P. Does God fix 
the reference of “1 m” in wi by taking it from wa ?  
Let us have a closer look at wi while trying to make 
sense of what Kripke wants us to see, i.e., that P is false in 
wi. If S(wi) is the standard meter and is thus used to fix the 
reference of “1 m” in wi, P will be true. Thus Kripke must 
assume that S(wi) is not used as the standard meter and 
that the meter is defined differently in wi. Certainly the  
 
meter cannot be defined in wi by means of S(wa), because 
S(wa) does not exist in wi. It must be defined differently, by 
another stick, by means of the wavelength of light, or in 
some other way. But in whatever way this is done, 
whatever the definition of 1 m in wi might be, the probabil-
ity that 1 m (wi) = 1 m (wa) is zero, because there are 
infinitely many, even uncountably many different lengths. 
(We can make sense of the intuitive idea that lengths 
between two worlds can be compared as long as these 
two worlds are not too different from each other, which we 
assume is the case between wa and wi.)  
Of course S(wi) is longer than S(wa), and one can say 
that the length of stick S is contingent, that it just has the 
length it happens to have. But in the context of statement 
P, stick S has to be understood as the standard meter 
stick, be it in wa or in wi, and the reference of “1 m” has to 
be understood as being determined by stick S. Forgetting 
this in wi amounts to changing the meaning of P in wi. 
Based on what I have said so far, it seems to me that 
Kripke has not given us an example of the contingent a 
priori. 
Let us now have a look at Kant again. What would be a 
priori about P in Kant’s eyes is, I think, the knowledge that 
there is a certain order and continuity in the world, 
especially that lengths do not change chaotically, that the 
concept of length therefore makes sense, and that we can 
set up a standard of length. We know for instance that if a 
stick S’ is as long as S and another stick S’’ as long as S’, 
then S’’ is also as long as S; or that if S’ is twice as long as 
S and S’’ again twice as long a S’, then S’’ is four times the 
length of S. In fact, to know P a priori we have to know 
many things of that kind and statement P has to be read 
as telling, or presupposing, a whole story, namely the story 
of setting up a standard of length and whatever this 
requires. The a priori aspect of P can thus be suitably 
expressed by an if-then statement, where a long story 
underlies (or should be expressed by) the if-part. 
Kripke thinks that contingency is a matter of metaphys-
ics and not of epistemology, which leads him to say that 
S(wi) is not 1 m (wa) long. But this is not what P says 
when you look at it as known a priori. P is about the 
relation between the meter and the stick S in one and the 
same world (and not about two items from two different 
worlds). Kripke distorts the meaning of P when he argues 
that it is contingent. Furthermore, we know a priori not only 
that P, but in a way (by imagination) we also know a priori 
that S(wi) is not 1 m (wa) long. I do not see how we can 
distinguish metaphysics and epistemology here, nor how 
we can ever circumvent or undercut the latter. 
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